By Dionis Cenuşa° – initially published on IPN
° Dionis Cenuşa is a political scientist from Moldova who works as Program Director on Energy Security at the Independent Economic Think-tank “Expert-Group”, based in Chisinau.
The low interest in underlining the role of the European agenda, both from electoral contestants and from Brussels, strengthens volens nolens messages from the supporters of the Eurasian Union and Russia…
The
main political actors in the Moldovan parliamentary elections of 24
February 2019 show a selective, visibly timid and/or incoherent approach
to electoral debates around the country’s external orientation. The
reluctance to geopolitical discourse is observed in political parties
associated either positively or negatively with the EU, even if recent
polls show that the population has a predisposition toward European
integration. The low involvement of the European topic in the electoral
campaign differs from the electoral behavior of the pro-European parties
in the 2014 legislative elections. In contrast, the pro-Russian forces
use geopolitics more intensely to stimulate voters.
Major political parties invoking a particular affiliation with
the European integration process can be divided into two categories.
The first group includes the governing party (the Democratic Party). The
latter has decided to refer, but in a minimalist style, to the
partnership with the EU that is concomitantly strongly overshadowed by
socio-economic issues. In fact, by underlining the importance of
infrastructure or wages of public employees, Democrats have tried to get
closer to the voters in a more palpable way than by operating with
somewhat abstract content of European integration. The Election Bloc
“ACUM”, which also prioritized the internal agenda and whose epicenter
is the fight against corruption, represents the second group. The
absence of an exclusive or monopolistic pro-EU discourse by the
Democrats left room for extra-parliamentary opposition to include
ambitious promises in its electoral bid, such as meeting the eligibility
criteria for EU membership by 2023. On the other side, the Socialists’
claims balanced between the generalization of EU’s responsibility for
current risks and regressions in Moldova and the imaginative benefits of
integration into the Eurasian Union.
On average, about 10% of voters with pro-EU visions (about
47%) do not find themselves in the parties that lean to EU, which can
accumulate about 36% together – PDM and Electoral Bloc NOW. At the same
time, according to the most recent polls, the share of Socialist
supporters (PSRM) coincides with supporters of the idea of joining the
Eurasian Economic Union (See Table below).
Table. The geopolitical and electoral options in Moldova,%
| PSRM | PDM | Bloc NOW (PAS and the Platform Dignity and Truth) | Pro-EU | Pro-Eurasian Union | |
| IRI, February 2019 | 39 | 14 | 22 | 46 | 39 |
| IMAS, February 2019 | 26 | 19,4 | 16,8 | 47 | 39 |
Sourse: Latest polls – IRI, IMAS
At
the same time, the hesitations to involve the European vector in
electoral discourse are determined by EU’s caution in relation to
Moldovan politics. The cooling of relations caused by the cancellation
of municipal elections (IPN, 25 June 2018) and the suspension of financial assistance (IPN, 24 September 2018), both registered in 2018, discouraged image transactions between the European institutions and the Moldovan authorities.
Three arguments that explain PDM’s distancing from European integration
The deliberate distancing from the European topic by Democrats
is confirmed by their electoral program, which excludes the mention of
European integration and uses predominantly generalist formulations,
such as Europe. Moreover, the EU reference is in the last place in the
electoral program (point 9 out of total 9),
where the electoral promises are slightly touching the EU, presented as
a Western actor. On the one hand, the claimed intention is to
“strengthen the relations” with the EU, as a Western partner. And, on
the other hand, PDM promises to maintain “a categorical pro-Western
option”, which is equated with the “accelerated implementation of the
Association Agreement” with the EU. Such a reserved character toward the
European integration can have at least three explanations.
Firstly, in terms of electoral tactics, Democrats have been
forced to minimize pro-European rhetoric in order to keep away the
allegations of their contribution to the deterioration of dialogue with
the EU. Both voters and electoral contestants’ attention has been
shifted to internal issues, where Democrats dominate the formation of
public perceptions due to the combination of intense administrative
resources and populist policies.
The second explanation relates to the priority of efficient
vote accumulation. Practically, both pro-Moldova and pro-EU positions
have a similar attraction power of public of about 33-34% (IMAS, December 2018).
In order to minimize association with the EU, which is useless as it is
abundant in criticism, PDM has internalized political discourse and
emptying it from the geopolitical component. Thus, the party decided to
move towards a wider electorate and entered a direct competition with
the Socialists, who relied on the same tactics when they took over the
idea of a multi-vector foreign policy based on Moldovan national
interest (IPN, 23 April 2018).
Third, the Democrats link the migration to a geopolitically
neutral terrain to post-election calculations. Keeping the power is only
likely if the PDM gives up from any categorical positions on sensitive
subjects, such as it is still the deepening relations with the EU.
Therefore, the Democrats artificially create a flexible environment for
forging post-electoral coalitions, including with representatives of
forces that share pro-Russian views. In none of the cases, PDM intends
to abandon the Association Agreement with the EU, but on the contrary
insists principally on maintaining it in active phase, promising only
speed and no discipline and quality in its implementation.
Extra-parliamentary opposition – the most pro-EU political force
The Joint Electoral Platform of the Action and Solidarity
Party (PAS) and Platform “Dignity and Truth” (DA Platform) – the “NOW”
Bloc, has adopted an ambitious vision for the European integration,
especially in comparison with the calculated reluctance of Democrats.
Thus, the opposition forces promised to prepare the country for EU
membership by 2023 (ACUM, 2019).
The major benefit of this electoral goal is the shaping of a
unique pro-European profile that is easily identifiable for the voter.
Monopolizing the pro-EU speech stimulates electoral opportunities in
favor of the opposition.
The rhetoric of European integration, adopted by the Bloc NOW,
however, contains an element of incoherence. Thus, the opposition
proposes a deadline of 2023 to bring Moldova to EU requirements, but
without adjusting the entire electoral program to this goal, and missing
to turn it into a coherent and convincing kind of “roadmap” for that
purpose. On the contrary, the European integration is projected rather
as an isolated policy in terms of foreign policy and partly in
connection with Moldova-Romania relations (Chapter 14 out of a total of 21).
The Socialists do not give up Euroscepticism
The most aggressive geopolitical tone was taken over by the
Socialists (PSRM), who are building a series of false, Eurosceptic
arguments around the Association Agreement with the EU. The clear
intention of PSRM is to make a negative image transfer to all political
parties advocating a minimal close relationship with the EU – both the
PDM and the Bloc NOW.
First, the Socialists compare the implementation of
the Association Agreement with a hidden form of realizing the unionist
project – the reunification of Romania with Moldova. The second source
of criticism lies in the contestation of the legitimacy of this
agreement for the fact that its negotiation involved a confidentiality
regime. Thirdly, there is an attempt to alter the significance
of the agreement by attributing non-Orthodox traits to it, which are
contradictory to the traditional values. Last but not least,
the Socialists undermine the liberalization of the visa-free regime with
the EU for not including a permissive clause for hiring Moldovans on
the European labor market. All these negative aspects addressed to the
EU are used to contrast with the advantages, artificially concluded by
the Socialists from the integration with the Eurasian Union, and which
refer to the permanent neutrality, preferential access to the Russian
market, guarantees for migrants and the protection of the Orthodox
Christian space (Socialistii.md, 2019).
Instead of conclusions …
The pro-European rhetoric is present in the electoral campaign
of 2019, but to a lesser extent than in previous parliamentary
elections. Electoral contestants manipulate the degree of geopolitical
electoral discourse based on (post) election calculus.
Thus, although the Bloc NOW assumes the most robust pro-EU
message, it seems to be somehow fragmented and restricted to the foreign
policy dimension. PDM is interested in the EU but only in maintaining
the Association Agreement with the EU. And the Socialists opted for a
profoundly Eurosceptic approach, but rather to build a more favorable
image for the Eurasian Union and the dialogue with Russia.
The low interest in emphasizing the role of the European
agenda, both from the electoral competitors and from Brussels,
strengthens volens nolens messages coming from the supporters of the
Eurasian Union and Russia. Consequently, the percentage superiority of
pro-European sympathies get devalued if not fully utilized, and
therefore, the Eurosceptic views get more visible, even if they have
fewer supporters.
