By Dionis Cenuşa° – initially published on IPN
° Dionis Cenuşa is a political scientist from Moldova who works as Program Director on Energy Security at the Independent Economic Think-tank “Expert-Group”, based in Chisinau.
Owing to the existence of pro-Russian parties that are ready to reach agreements with for now unknown concessions, Russia’s prospects in Moldova are clearly superior to those it can pursue in Georgia or Ukraine…
The dynamics of the interest expressed by the European Union (EU) in
Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia through the Association Agreements
influence the behavior of the Russian factor. The multi-dimensionality
of the European integration, conditioned powerfully by internal
political motivations, enabled to remodel the foreign interdependence
maintained by the three countries. However, the greater concentration on
the relationship with the EU didn’t annul at all Russia’s presence, but
rather stimulated its transformation.
From political and economic viewpoints, the contact areal of
Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia expanded first of all in geopolitical
terms, but also in political and economic terms. The more aggressive was
the involution of the Russian factor, the more intense was the
determination of the three countries to develop (geo)political
partnerships with other players.
Two reasons dictate the change of the parameters of the Russian
factor. On the one hand, the capacity and openness of the EU to offer
more political support and access to its financial resources, with which
the budget gaps in the three countries can be filled, it is what
matters. On the other hand, the variations of the Russian factor
correlate with the availability of appropriate internal political
benchmarks in the form of loyal political forces and favorable political
conjuncture. In Ukraine, the pro-Russian political parties cannot
recover as long as Russia maintains a warlike policy in Donbass. The
advancing of nationalist ideas inside the Georgian political narrative,
even in the absence of robust pro-Russian parties, benefits Russia as
this inhibits or can even reverse the liberal reforms. The Russian
factor is most favorable positioned in Moldova, where it has a variety
of friendly local players at political, social and ethnical levels.
The engagement of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia in structural
reforms distorts Russia’s capacity to influence their decision-making
mechanisms. The consolidation of state institutions, the enhancement of
transparency in governance or the fortification of the courts against
corrupt rulers imposes those rules of the game that drastically diminish
the maneuvering space of the Russian factor. Evidently, Russia can
practice at home the rule of law or human rights and, respectively, can
respect them outside, but namely their non-use is an essential resource
for fueling its geopolitical power. From this point of view, the
political regime in Moscow is ready to invest in the extension,
restoration or amplification of the dependences that others have toward
it. That’s why the Russian support is directed to local political
elements that prefer to govern to the detriment of the rule of law
rather than within its limits.
Three areas where Russia’s influence has diminished
The substantiation of the dialogue with the EU inevitably led to
the diminishing of the Russian influence in three important areas that
earlier could easily generate major political and socioeconomic costs
for the political class in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. After the
Association Agreements with the EU were signed and the mobility
conditions were liberalized, the three dimensions of dependence on
Russia decreased, but didn’t fully disappear.
First of all, the migration flows to Russia entered into a
competition with the human flows moving to Europe. The rapprochement of
the three countries with the EU accelerated inter-human interaction and
the European business community from the proximity became a magnet for
the economically active population of Moldova and Ukraine. Owing to the
geographical distance, the Georgians are yet powerfully connected to
Russia, despite the war of 2008. The EU’s enlargement to the East
emphasized Moldovans‘ interest in the Romanian nationality and
contributed to the growth of the economy of Poland that regards Ukraine
as the closest pool of cheap labor force.
Unofficial data for Moldova show that about 1 million Moldovans are
involved in seasonal or permanent migration, as opposed to 4.6 million Ukrainians and under 1 million Georgians.
The Russian military aggression against Ukraine stimulated internal
migration in Ukraine from the Eastern regions to the West and also
external migration in favor of the EU states. The extension of the
geography of migration flows from the three countries reduced Russia’s
possibility of using migrants as an instrument of political pressure. On
the one hand, the restoring of this leverage by the Russian authorities
depends on the performance of the Russian economy. On the other hand,
this aspect is determined by the demographic and economic coefficients
of the given states and by the political participation level of their
diaspora situated in the West.
Foreign trade is the second element that represented the strong
point of Russian influence in Moldova prior to the liberalization of
trade with the EU. Currently, the supplies to the EU are larger than 65%
of the total exports, while those to Russia decreased to fewer than 15%
in 2017 (3DCFTA, 2018).
The modification of the balance in the Russian-Ukrainian trade is due
both to Ukraine’s integration into the European market and to the
reciprocal commercial restrictions imposed as a result of the Russian
military aggression in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea. The figures
for 2017 indicate that Ukraine’s flows of goods to the EU strengthened
at the level of 40%, while trade with Russia fell to under 10% (3DCFTA, 2018).
After a period of intense liberalization of trade and the overcoming of
the bans imposed by Russia after 2000, Georgia’s exports to Russia
doubled in 2017 compared with 2013, while those to the EU rose from
about 20% in 2013 to 24% in the same period (3DCFTA, 2018).
The diversification of export markets enabled the three countries to
reduce Russia’s temptation to use trade as a political weapon, at least
temporarily.
The energy sector is another important artery by which the
dependence of Russia was manifested, mainly in Moldova and Ukraine. This
way, Moldova remains for now under the monopoly of Gazprom, which
controls over 50% of the actions of the Moldovan gas supplier
Moldovagaz. At the same time, the extended Moldovan-Russian contract for
the supply of gas expires in 2019, while the building of
interconnections with Romania is planned for not earlier than in 2020.
Even if Ukraine purchases natural gas, including Russian one, from
Europe, there is a risk of losing the role of transiting country if Nord
Stream 2 is built. Georgia is different from the other two countries as
it buys natural gas from Azerbaijan and cover its electricity needs
from the domestic production. The status of member of the Energy
Community helps the three countries to systematize their energy sectors
and to liberalize them. This way the dominating position of the Russian
energy companies is endangered.
Moldova is the most vulnerable to the reviving of the Russian factor
Russia’s interference in Moldovan politics is most probable
compared to Georgia or Ukraine cases, which, besides the European
integration, are attracted into strategic dialogues with the U.S. and
have political classes and populations inclined to support the entry
into NATO. Russia’s minimum goal in Moldova is to create a precedent of
reversing or at least of reviewing the pro-European geopolitical course.
The Party of Socialists already became engaged in regular and
profound political discussions with Moscow. The President of Moldova
negotiates diverse agreements with the regime of Vladimir Putin as
regards migration and bilateral trade. All these arrangements have a
temporary character and are synchronized with the parliamentary
elections of February 2019. Thus, the Moldovan migrants are seduced to return to Moldova until February 23, before the elections, so as to be able to go back to Russia in March. At the same time, several categories of Moldovan products
(fruit, vegetables and wines) can enter again the Russian market,
duty-free, but only during the first half of this year. It is evident
that Russia offers President Igor Dodon and the Party of Socialists
electoral support so as to increase their chances to hold a victory in
the parliamentary elections.
Namely the ease with which the pro-Russian rhetoric can expand from
the Presidential Office to Parliament by democratic ways, even if in a
powerfully distorted manner, makes Moldova the most vulnerable to
Russian factor’s reviving. Neither in Georgia in 2018 nor in Ukraine in
2019, Russia has felt so confortable as in the case of the parliamentary
elections in Moldova.
Instead of conclusions…
Russia’s influence in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia diminished after
the European integration has been internalized in the political
processes of these countries. As the rapprochement with the EU could not
be stopped, the Russian factor learned to adjust itself, waiting for a
suitable moment to reenter the game.
Owing to the existence of pro-Russian parties that are ready to
reach agreements with for now unknown concessions, Russia’s prospects in
Moldova are clearly superior to those it can pursue in Georgia or
Ukraine.
The Moldovan case reminds once again of the danger that results
from the instrumentalization of the European integration by oligarchic
regimes for the purpose of preventing reforms.
