By Dionis Cenuşa° – initially published on IPN
° Dionis Cenuşa is a political scientist from Moldova who works as Program Director on Energy Security at the Independent Economic Think-tank “Expert-Group”, based in Chisinau.
The focus of the PSRM-ACUM coalition must be on strengthening external legitimacy and extending it to public opinion in the country. That is why the new PSRM-ACUM government needs a strong active communication mechanism to win the informational warfare in the country and abroad, on which positions the Democrats might be forced to negotiate a possible retreat…
After almost three months from the validation of the results of the parliamentary elections (9 March 2019),
the political situation in Moldova is rapidly developing new outlines,
postponing the talks concerning the early elections however without
canceling them for good. The sudden warming of relations between the
Bloc ACUM and the Socialists is temporary and is due to the fear of
early elections in the circumstances of a mixed voting system and the
maintenance of the Democratic Party in power.
Even if Igor Dodon warned that he could dissolve the Parliament already on June 10 (Free Europe, 7 June 2019),
he became the main figure in advancing Maia Sandu as prime minister.
The geopolitical discrepancies have lost importance, at least for the
moment, and the entire energy of Socialists and ACUM has been focused on
adopting, at a rapid pace, a set of decisions aimed at changing the
status quo, defined and controlled by the Democratic Party and his
leader, the oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc.
The rapprochement between Socialists and ACUM has received the support of the EU, the US and Russia (IPN, 8 June 2019),
for which the two forces are enough compatible to create a viable
coalition. The favorable positioning of the external actors towards a
PSRM-ACUM coalition crystallized shortly before the 3-month deadline,
when the Commissioner for European Neighborhood Johannes Hahn, the
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Kozak and the US State Department
representative Bradley A. Freden encouraged the two forces to find a
common denominator. The major risks resulting from early elections,
highlighted by Johannes Hahn, concerned the weakening of the country’s
macro-financial stability as a result of the interruption of the
International Monetary Fund and the EU (Free Europe, 3 June 2019).
There is a multiple evidence that the Russian factor, with and without
his will, played a substantial role in determining President Igor Dodon
and the Socialists to accept almost all the conditions of ACUM, even if
half of them were rejected and early elections seemed to be the most
preferable scenario.
Finally, the temporary partnership of the PSRM-ACUM has
started to operate particularly lightly, based on 61 votes, setting an
ambitious agenda for decoupling, as soon as possible, state institutions
from the influence of the Democrats. The first day of Parliament’s
activity, after the first and last meeting of 21 March 2019, blocked at
then at Socialists’ decision, took place in extreme conditions. From the
technical point of view, the legislature’s secretariat was absent, and
the session room was disconnected from the power source (Privesc.eu, 8 June 2019). On the political side, the legislature was the target of the allegations of unconstitutionality (Constitutional Court, 8 June 2019), launched by the Constitutional Court through a range of decisions issued between 7 and 8 June (110 b, 111a, 112a),
upon the petitions from the Democratic Party. The pressure on the
legitimacy of the new government is enormous. The PAS-PSRM MPs are
planning to use the parliamentary majority (61 out of 101 votes) to
force the change of the composition of the Constitutional Court. The
latter was condemned for the “usurpation of power” in favor of the
Democratic Party and called to resign immediately. The probability of
Courts’ judges dismissing is rather low because three out of six
positions (of six-years term) of judges have been renewed with
deviations from the proceedings at the end of 2018, with people close to
the Democratic Party (Constitutional Court, 14 December 2018).
Located in a vague field of constitutionality, the new government must
solve urgently four issues to survive: 1) strengthening legitimacy; 2)
attracting the sympathies of the institutions; 3) build a solid image of
integrity in the country and abroad; 4) accumulate external legitimacy.
The impact of the Russian factor on the political crisis in Moldova – “with and without good willingness”
The turning point in preventing the early elections intervened
during Igor Dodon’s last visit to Russia (June 6), when he met with
Dmitri Kozak at the Moldovan-Russian Economic Council, organized within
the framework of the International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg (Presedinte.md, 6 June 2019).
Earlier, on June 3, Kozak declared himself in favor of a viable
coalition, albeit temporary, between PSRM and ACUM, in order “to
organize fair and transparent elections” (Radio Chisinau, 3 June 2019) and the fight against Vladimir Plahotniuc.
According to sources of Russian propaganda (Sputnik, 6 June 2019),
in St Petersburg, Dodon suggested that there was a likelihood of
avoiding the snap elections, which otherwise had to be triggered on June
10 (Free Europe, 7 June 2019).
At that time, there was no clarity about the future coalition partner
of the Socialists, but the mandatory condition imposed on it was that
foreign policy should be balanced or put in other words – multi-vector.
Both Democrats and ACUM were open to negotiations with the Socialists
already on May 31, but initially only the former openly offered the
speaker position. The content of the offer from ACUM was not made
public, but the proposed deadline was June 9 (AGORA, May 31, 2019). In
order to prevent a PSRM-PDM coalition, the components NOW accept the
candidacy of Zinaida Greceanii for the Speaker of Parliament (AGORA, 6 June 2019).
Subsequently, the Socialists’ Republican Council was decisive in
excluding Democrats from the equation and opting for cooperation with
ACUM (PSRM, 7 June 2019). Thus, the anti-ACUM protests orchestrated by PDM to put pressure on the Socialists failed (Adevărul, 7 June 2019).
Against this backdrop, President Dodon announces the
shortening of his visit to Russia and at his return to the country he
communicates about renouncing the idea of dissolving Parliament. He
informs the Russian Ambassador, Head of the EU Delegation and US Embassy
representative about the decision to consult parliamentary factions on
10 June (President.md, June 8, 2019). Surprisingly, but once the PSRM
(Socialists) has decided to enter into dialogue with the ACUM, the
Constitutional Court publishes the decision on President Dodon’s appeal
submitted 17 days ago (May 22, 2019) and states that the final day for
activating the Parliament’s dissolution is when 3 months ends (Constitutional Court, 7 June 2019).
Moreover, after PSRM and ACUM have convened meetings at the Parliament,
on Saturday, June 8, the Court clarifies for the media that the
deadline for the functioning of the Parliament is June 7 (Constitutional Court, 8 June 2019), using the term “90 days “, alongside the “three months” one, as provided by the Constitution.
In addition to the anti-ACUM protests initiated on June 7, the
Democrats launched a media attack against President Igor Dodon and the
Socialists, as they together with the ACUM were forming the Parliament’s
structures and the Government. Thus, media sources controlled by the
PDM (Democrats) have published compromising material of dubious quality
according to which Igor Dodon would have tried to agree on the
federalization of the country as part of an arrangement with Russia (Publika.md, 8 June 2019).
Parallel to the accusation of country betrayal, the PDM has accused
Igor Dodon and the Socialists of using Russian funding for the election
campaign of February 24, 2019 (PDM, 8 June 2019).
Both Socialists and Moscow through Dmitri Kozak’s voice contradicted
the Democrats’ version, accusing the latter of accepting the idea of
changing radically Moldova’s foreign policy in return for a coalition
with the Socialists (RIA-Novosti, 9 June 2019).
Russia’s interest in a coalition against the PDM was a strong
argument that favored the opening of the PSRM to the Bloc ACUM and the
many concessions the party made to the bloc, especially regarding the
composition of the Government. Thus, the PSRM only received the Ministry
of Defense and the Reintegration Office, although it intended to
strengthen the powers of President Dodon by taking control of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration and the Ministry of
Domestic Affairs. At the same time, the allegations of country treason
and the possible impeachment vote against President Dodon for promoting
the Russian agenda (the federalization of the country) became another
indirect and undesirable influence of the Russian factor on the
Socialists’ decision to coordinate all the steps with ACUM. Perhaps,
through prolific cooperation with ACUM and the concessions made to the
Bloc, the Socialists are planning to disperse the criticism and
political risks, respectively, of the alleged commitment toward Russia
concerning the fulfilling of federalization of Moldova. It is clear that
Democrats can contemplate an attack on Igor Dodon with a vote of
non-confidence in the Parliament, and that the representatives ACUM may
be tempted to dethrone the President Dodon, producing at least early
presidential elections before 2020.
What’s next?
Even if it is a temporary political partnership (“temporary
agreement”), it is considered vital by ACUM and, more recently, by the
Socialists, not only to prevent early elections, but also to begin the
de-oligarchization of the Moldovan political system. In the first phase,
the PSRM-ACUM coalition agreed on the election of Zinaida Greceanii for
the position of speaker of Parliament, although with the refraining of
four deputies from ACUM (Deschide.md, 8 June 2019). In return, the Socialists unanimously supported a mixed government led by Maia Sandu (IPN, 8 June 2019),
which has Andrei Năstase, the leader of the Platform of Dignity and
Truth (“DA”), as Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister of Domestic
Affairs. Two offices in the named Government are ceded to the Socialists
– the Reintegration Office (Vasile Şova) and the Defense Ministry
(Pavel Voicu) (TV8, 8 June 2019).
Together, the 61 MPs from the PSRM (35 seats) and ACUM (26 seats)
adopted the declaration by which Moldova is qualified as a “captured
state”, and dismissed the leadership of the Intelligence and Security
Service (SIS) and the Anti- Corruption Centre.
Externally, the Presidential Office will challenge the
Constitutional Court’s rulings at the European Court of Human Rights and
will send them to the Venice Commission for assessment (NewsMaker, 8 June 2019).
However, the government’s external legitimacy requires urgent and broad
approval, which, due to confusion over the constitutionality of
political decisions in Parliament, may be delayed. For the time being,
only the leadership of the European People’s Party has welcomed the
formation of the government led by the bloc ACUM (press release sent on
June 8, 2019) as a starting point for the “return from the state
captured to democracy”. At the same time, the Socialists use the message
of support published on social media by Constantin Kosaciov, President
of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian Federation Council as an
“international recognition” (PSRM, 8 June 2019).
The only major international actor who officially pronounced its stand
regarding the decisions adopted by 61 MPs of Socialists and ACUM is the
EU, which for now denotes more caution than support for the new
government headed by Maia Sandu. Instead, the European side urged all
political parties to calm, restraint and political dialogue (EEAS, 8 June 2019).
The gestures of the Democrats show their concern, but not a
panic, because for the first time since 2015 they do not completely
control the situation. From this point of view, they appeal to
instruments of intimidation of the public sector and manipulation of
public opinion. Thus, the PDM is preparing for mass protests against
ACUM and PSRM, projected in the controlled press as “organizers of a
coup d’etat”. The strongest conspiracies are dedicated to the
Socialists, who pay the price for benevolently merging with the Russian
sphere of influence. Democrats tend to keep the state of affairs least
affected by the temporary coalition between the components of ACUM and
PSRM, which this time brings results, as opposed to the failed
coagulation of the anti-PDM trans-party opposition in the period
2015-2016. The triggering of early elections remains the main objective
of the PDM, and PSRM-PAS governance needs to gain poor external
recognition to stop that. At present, even after the elections, the
image of the Democrats abroad has remained wrinkled. And the new phase
of the political crisis that Moldova enters due to the decisions of the
Constitutional Court maximizes the criticism against the Democrats. The
latter attempt to compensate offset the lacking external credibility
through showing off domestic strength.
There are persistent major risks of confrontation between
pro-PDM protesters actively mobilized around state institutions
(Ministry of Domestic Affairs, Prosecutor Office, etc.), with those who
support the PSRM-PAS government. Therefore, external mediation becomes a
guarantee of stability for the next few days and even weeks. But the
foreign partners will not be able to resolve the constitutionality of
Maia Sandu’s Government and the one of the legislative body under the
leadership of Zinaida Greceanii. The constitutional order is one of the
most sensitive areas in which at least the European partners avoid a
clear-cut interference. A political dialogue with external mediation can
become a constructive and peaceful solution to avoid degradation of the
situation and a peaceful transition of power. But even such mediation
does not remove entirely the possibility of early elections from the
calculations.
Instead of conclusions…
The political crisis in Moldova is on the brink of a
constitutional crisis, because of the politicized activity of the
Constitutional Court and the erosion of confidence in constitutional
settlement in general. The formation of the new government led by Maia
Sandu is disputed by PDM, which creates a new situation when the old
executive may refuse to leave the institutions in favor of the newly
elected.
If local political forces fail to establish a dialogue and
bypass the degradation of the political environmet, then the salvation
role will come to external mediators. Early elections could be a
compromise solution proposed by the Democrats, but denied by ACUM and
PSRM.
The focus of the PSRM-ACUM coalition must be on strengthening
external legitimacy and extending it to public opinion in the country.
That is why the new PSRM-ACUM government needs a strong active
communication mechanism to win the informational warfare in the country
and abroad, on which positions the Democrats might be forced to
negotiate a possible retreat.
